DEFI RISK AND SMART CONTRACT SECURITY

The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and transferFrom Functions

4 min read
#Smart Contract #security #ERC20 #TransferFrom #Approve
The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and transferFrom Functions

I remember a day when I had to approve a Uniswap v3 transaction. The UI explicitly warned me that I was setting an allowance, and I had to click the “Allow” button separately. That small barrier saved my wallet from an unintended over‑approval. Small habits, big protection.


1. The approval dilemma

I remember a day when I had to approve a Uniswap v3 transaction. The UI explicitly warned me that I was setting an allowance, and I had to click the “Allow” button separately. That small barrier saved my wallet from an unintended over‑approval. Small habits, big protection.


2. Understanding the fine print

If you’re building a portfolio or just keeping an eye on a token you own, understanding the tiny details of approve and transferFrom that can make or break your wallet /understanding-the-risks-of-erc20-approval-and-transferfrom-in-defi can be the difference between peace of mind and a costly mistake.


3. Approval pitfalls

The first step is research. Find the contract address, then:

  1. Read the source. Platforms like Etherscan provide verified source code. Look for the approve and transferFrom implementations.
  2. Check allowance patterns. Make sure the contract doesn’t automatically set uint256.Max on the first call. Look for require checks or safe math use. For a deeper dive into why setting a blanket allowance can be dangerous, see “Beyond the Basics: ERC20 Approval Pitfalls for Smart Contracts” /beyond-the-basics-erc20-approval-pitfalls-for-smart-contracts.
  3. Look for re‑entrancy locks. Although transferFrom is a simple transfer, some contracts add hooks that call external contracts. A re‑entrancy vulnerability could let an attacker run multiple transferFroms in a single transaction.
  4. Check for self‑destruct or upgrade patterns. A mis‑managed upgradeable contract may expose old logic that is insecure.
  5. Audit reports. If the token is popular, there should be at least an external audit. Read the findings; a missing review is a red flag.

4. Spotting a malicious contract

The “gasless front‑end scam” you mentioned in the pool’s documentation is a common tactic. If a contract automatically sets uint256.Max on the first call, it is likely vulnerable. A good mitigation strategy is covered in “Guarding Against transferFrom Attacks: A Guide for DeFi Projects” /guarding-against-transferfrom-attacks-a-guide-for-defi-projects.


5. Transfer‑logic attacks

The incident with Phantom highlighted how transferFrom can be abused in loops. The attacker took advantage of a bug that let them “spend” their allowance more than what was approved. The mechanics of such a loop attack are dissected in “The Anatomy of transferFrom Attacks and How to Stop Them” /the-anatomy-of-transferfrom-attacks-and-how-to-stop-them.


6. Mitigation and best practices

If you see a token that uses permit or a similar pattern, you are looking at a more secure approval workflow. For a concise guide on implementing this securely, check out “Secure Your ERC20 Tokens: Best Practices for Approval and transferFrom” /secure-your-erc20-tokens-best-practices-for-approval-and-transferfrom. This resource also reinforces the importance of using the “set allowance → single transfer → reset to zero” pattern.


7. Actionable steps

  1. Don’t lock a large allowance at once. Set small, precise limits. Use the pattern: set allowance → do a single transfer → set allowance to zero.
  2. Verify the spender. Look up the address, not just the name. A contract’s address is the only thing that matters.
  3. Use tools that alert on repeated approvals. A transaction that repeatedly modifies allowances or transfers a disproportionate amount should raise an alarm.
  4. Stay updated on audit reports. Even if a token is known, audits can surface new bugs over time.
  5. Lean on community. Read project discussions, ask on forums, and observe the reaction to suspicious activity.

It’s not a silver bullet, but it gives you a disciplined way to approach token approvals. The markets test our patience before rewarding us—so we keep our eyes open and our wallets protected, one approval at a time.

Emma Varela
Written by

Emma Varela

Emma is a financial engineer and blockchain researcher specializing in decentralized market models. With years of experience in DeFi protocol design, she writes about token economics, governance systems, and the evolving dynamics of on-chain liquidity.

Discussion (8)

AL
Alex 7 months ago
It’s a good reminder that the token standard is only a contract. How many exchanges still make users approve unlimited amounts? I personally only give the exact allowance I need. That stops a lot of unauthorized moves.
LU
Lucius 7 months ago
You’re just parroting the basics, Alex. The real mastery is in batching and controlling deadlines. Anyone who writes a simple wrapper is just a beginner.
IV
Ivan 7 months ago
What about the cases where a token has a non‑standard transferFrom implementation? The article glosses over it. Anyone else see funky ERC20s that skip checks and just spit out whatever they get?
MA
Marina 6 months ago
I’ve run into it on a DeFi protocol that was only 30 kB. They hardcoded transferFrom to not burn the allowance, and the rug pulled out of the pool. Always audit that function.
ZO
Zoe 6 months ago
Those cases are rare but real. I found a token that swapped when transferFrom was called and never returned the right amount. Good catch, Ivan. That’s why I always use libraries with checks.
DM
Dmitri 7 months ago
Ivan, that token issue was like a headline. The only fix was to fork the contract and re‑deploy. Then the original owner had to revoke all approvals. That’s why I always scan the code before approving anything a new dApp asks for.
LU
Lucius 6 months ago
I built a 0.1% gas optimization that rewrites approve to a low‑level call with an inline allowance check. Everyone else is still using the naive pattern. If you want to be future‑proof, this is the direction to head. I write the docs on that later.
ZO
Zoe 6 months ago
Example: WBTC’s transferFrom has a re-entrancy guard that was missed in a forked version of the contract once. I learned the hard way that you can’t trust even popular tokens. Hard to keep all up to date.
SO
Sofia 6 months ago
Yo, some people think approve is just a safety net but it’s really a permission dance. When a dapp keeps approving big amounts, it gives them a backdoor. Keep that up, and my dapp’s code blew up yesterday.
MA
Marina 6 months ago
Adding on, there’s also the concept of “set a max allowance”, and the community still keeps using it. I recommend zeroing before setting a new max. It’s a small extra step that kills attacks that rely on lingering allowances.
MA
Marco 6 months ago
Nice breakdown. I've seen a lot of folks over‑approve tokens and then it just goes wrong. Worth keeping an eye on.
DM
Dmitri 6 months ago
Yeah, some dapps ignore the fact that approve leaves that 0 allowance dangling. I ran a scam my own way.

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Contents

Marco Nice breakdown. I've seen a lot of folks over‑approve tokens and then it just goes wrong. Worth keeping an eye on. on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Apr 16, 2025 |
Marina Adding on, there’s also the concept of “set a max allowance”, and the community still keeps using it. I recommend zeroin... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Apr 15, 2025 |
Sofia Yo, some people think approve is just a safety net but it’s really a permission dance. When a dapp keeps approving big a... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Apr 13, 2025 |
Zoe Example: WBTC’s transferFrom has a re-entrancy guard that was missed in a forked version of the contract once. I learned... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Mar 30, 2025 |
Lucius I built a 0.1% gas optimization that rewrites approve to a low‑level call with an inline allowance check. Everyone else... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Mar 26, 2025 |
Dmitri Ivan, that token issue was like a headline. The only fix was to fork the contract and re‑deploy. Then the original owner... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Mar 25, 2025 |
Ivan What about the cases where a token has a non‑standard transferFrom implementation? The article glosses over it. Anyone e... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Mar 24, 2025 |
Alex It’s a good reminder that the token standard is only a contract. How many exchanges still make users approve unlimited a... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Mar 24, 2025 |
Marco Nice breakdown. I've seen a lot of folks over‑approve tokens and then it just goes wrong. Worth keeping an eye on. on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Apr 16, 2025 |
Marina Adding on, there’s also the concept of “set a max allowance”, and the community still keeps using it. I recommend zeroin... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Apr 15, 2025 |
Sofia Yo, some people think approve is just a safety net but it’s really a permission dance. When a dapp keeps approving big a... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Apr 13, 2025 |
Zoe Example: WBTC’s transferFrom has a re-entrancy guard that was missed in a forked version of the contract once. I learned... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Mar 30, 2025 |
Lucius I built a 0.1% gas optimization that rewrites approve to a low‑level call with an inline allowance check. Everyone else... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Mar 26, 2025 |
Dmitri Ivan, that token issue was like a headline. The only fix was to fork the contract and re‑deploy. Then the original owner... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Mar 25, 2025 |
Ivan What about the cases where a token has a non‑standard transferFrom implementation? The article glosses over it. Anyone e... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Mar 24, 2025 |
Alex It’s a good reminder that the token standard is only a contract. How many exchanges still make users approve unlimited a... on The Hidden Threats of ERC20 Approve and... Mar 24, 2025 |